PANA/GSM authentication for Internet access by Pagliusi, Paulo & Mitchell, Chris J
PANA/GSM Authentication for Internet Access
Paulo S. Pagliusi and Chris J. Mitchell
Information Security Group
Royal Holloway, University of London
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK
P.S.Pagliusi@rhul.ac.uk, C.Mitchell@rhul.ac.uk
August 16, 2003
Abstract
Currently there are no Internet access authentication
protocols available that are lightweight, can be car-
ried over arbitrary access networks, and are flexi-
ble enough to be used in all the likely future ubiq-
uitous mobility access contexts. This article proposes
the PANA/GSM authentication protocol for hetero-
geneous network access as a step towards filling this
gap. A security analysis of the PANA/GSM proto-
col is also provided. This article aims primarily at
contributing to the design of authentication protocols
suitable for use in future heterogeneous Internet ac-
cess environments supporting ubiquitous mobility.
1 Introduction
Currently there are no authentication protocols avail-
able that are lightweight, can be carried over arbi-
trary access networks, and are flexible enough for use
with all the various access technologies likely to be
deployed to support future ubiquitous mobility. Fur-
thermore, existing access procedures need to be made
resistant to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks; they also
need to provide non-repudiation. The IETF PANA
(Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network
Access) work aims to provide a protocol [8] that will
be a network-layer authentication carrier for access
networks that support IP. PANA will be capable
of transporting any EAP (Extensible Authentication
Protocol) method [4] to enable access authentication.
In addition, the EAP/SIM protocol [9] specifies a
way of encapsulating the security parameters used
by the GSM (Global System for Mobile communica-
tion) system [19] within EAP. Once inside EAP, the
GSM parameters can thus be carried by PANA. In
this paper we present a proposal for combining GSM
authentication with EAP/SIM and PANA, which we
call PANA/GSM.
The goal of the PANA/GSM protocol is to pro-
vide an IP compatible, lightweight, relatively flexi-
ble and scalable authentication method that allows
a client to be authenticated in a heterogeneous In-
ternet access environment. Section 2 summarises
the GSM security services, Section 3 describes the
EAP/SIM protocol, and Section 4 explains the PANA
protocol. Section 5 then describes the proposed new
PANA/GSM authentication scheme. Section 6 anal-
yses the threats to the PANA/GSM protocol, Section
7 considers its advantages and disadvantages and, fi-
nally, Sections 8, 9, and 10 present possible further
work, conclusions and acknowledgements.
2 GSM Security Services
This section summarises the three GSM air inter-
face security services relevant here, i.e. subscriber
identity confidentiality, subscriber identity authenti-
cation and data confidentiality. Further details of
GSM security can be found in [12, 19]. Subscriber
identity confidentiality is achieved through the use
of temporary identities. Apart from at initial reg-
istration, a user is not identified employing his per-
manent identity, i.e. his IMSI (International Mobile
Subscriber Identity), but instead uses a temporary
identity known as the TMSI (Temporary Mobile Sub-
scriber Identity). To avoid user traceability, which
may lead to the compromise of subscriber identity
confidentiality, TMSIs are changed regularly by the
visited network (VN) in an ‘unlinkable’ way. In ad-
dition, they are transmitted to the Mobile Station
(MS) via an encrypted radio channel.
Subscriber identity authentication is used to au-
thenticate the MS to the VN. This service is based
on use of a secret key Ki, shared between the user’s
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and the Authen-
tication Centre (AuC) of the subscriber’s home net-
work (HN). For each subscriber, and whenever neces-
sary, the subscriber’s HN selects one or more random
challenge values RAND . Each RAND is input to a
cryptographic algorithm A3, along with the Ki for
that subscriber, and the output is known as XRES.
A set of pre-calculated (RAND, XRES ) pairs are
then supplied to the VN. Whenever the VN wishes
to authenticate the MS, it sends it one of the RAND
values. The MS inputs the RAND along with Ki
to algorithm A3, and sends the output, known as
SRES, back. The VN then compares the received
SRES with the stored XRES, and if they agree the
MS is deemed authentic. In order to provide data
confidentiality between the MS and the VN, an en-
cryption key Kc is also produced at the same time
as XRES/SRES is generated, again as a function of
RAND and Ki, and using a key generation algorithm
A8. The key Kc is passed from the AuC to the VN
with the RAND and XRES values, as part of what is
known as an ‘authentication triplet’ (RAND, XRES,
Kc), and used to encrypt user and signalling data
sent between the MS and the VN.
3 EAP/SIM Method
The EAP/SIM method [9] is an EAP mechanism for
authentication and session key distribution that uses
the GSM SIM [19]. It involves a client acting on
behalf of a user, an authenticating party, and an EAP
server [4]. The EAP server, which typically belongs
to the user’s home Internet AAA network, is able to
obtain authentication triplets from the subscriber’s
HN AuC. The EAP/SIM packet format and the use
of attributes are specified in section 7 of [9]. Either
the IMSI or the TMSI can be employed as part of the
user identifier. Section 5 of [9] describes user identity
management.
In EAP/SIM multiple RAND challenges are
used to generate several Kc keys, which are com-
bined to generate a ‘more secure’ key than can be
obtained from individual GSM triplets. In EAP/SIM
authentication, a Master Key (MK ) is first derived
using the hash function SHA-1 [11] from a combi-
nation of the user’s identity, n GSM confidentiality
keys Kc (n = 1, 2 or 3), the NONCE MT ran-
dom number freshly generate by the EAP client, and
other relevant context information, e.g. the identifier
of the EAP/SIM version in use. Keys derived from
the MK are subsequently used to generate tempo-
rary session keys for authentication, encryption, and
IV-generation. This includes the EAP/SIM Master
Session Key (MSK ) for encryption of the traffic be-
tween the client and the network, the authentication
key to be used with the Message Authentication Code
attribute (AT MAC), and the encryption key to be
used with the data encryption attribute. EAP/SIM
enhances GSM authentication by accompanying the
RAND challenges and other messages with a MAC
in order to provide mutual authentication. Finally,
EAP/SIM includes optional identity privacy support,
and an optional re-authentication procedure.
4 PANA Carrier Mechanism
This section briefly introduces the draft PANA proto-
col [8], a link-layer agnostic transport for EAP to en-
able client-to-network access authentication. PANA
runs between a PaC (PANA Client) and a PAA
(PANA Authentication Agent) situated in the access
network, where the PAA may optionally be a client
of an AAA infrastructure. PANA carries any authen-
tication mechanism that can be specified as an EAP
method (e.g. EAP/SIM), and can be used on any link
that supports IP. The header of every PANA packet
contains two sequence numbers to provide ordered
delivery of EAP messages: one transmitted sequence
number (tseq), and one received sequence number
(rseq). The payload of any PANA message consists
of zero or more Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs), e.g.
a cookie AVP used for making an initial handshake
robust against ‘blind DoS attacks’ [8], a MAC AVP
protecting the integrity of a PANA message, or an
EAP AVP that transports an EAP payload.
Two important features of PANA, namely the
security association (SA) and re-authentication, are
now described. Once the EAP method has com-
pleted, a session key (e.g. the EAP/SIM MSK ) is
shared by the PaC and the PAA. The session key is
provided to the PaC as part of the EAP key exchange
process, and the PAA can obtain the session key from
the EAP server via the AAA infrastructure (if used).
PANA SA establishment based on the EAP session
key is required where no physical or link layer secu-
rity is available. Two types of re-authentication (or
fast reconnection) are supported by PANA. The first
type enters the chosen EAP method (e.g. EAP/SIM)
at the authentication phase, where the initial hand-
shake phase can be omitted. The second type is based
on a single protected PANA message exchange with-
out entering the authentication phase.
5 PANA/GSM Protocol
The PANA/GSM method proposed here involves
three entities, namely the PaC (also referred to here
as the client, user or subscriber), the PAA (authen-
ticating party) and the EAP server. The PaC is as-
sociated with a network device and a set of GSM
credentials stored in a SIM, where these credentials
are used to prove the PaC identity for network access.
A possible implementation of the PaC would be an
Internet access device (e.g. a laptop) with a PC card
inserted in the PCMCIA1 socket, where the PC card
is itself equipped with a GSM-enabled SIM card.
The PAA authenticates the GSM credentials
provided by the PaC and grants network access. In
the context of this document, the EAP server is
implemented on the AAA server and has an inter-
face to the GSM network, operating as a gateway
between the Internet AAA network and the GSM
authentication infrastructure. The PAA is thus an
1Personal Computer Memory Card International Associa-
tion (www.pcmcia.org/).
AAA client that communicates with the user’s EAP
server through an AAA protocol supporting EAP
(e.g. Diameter EAP [10]). PANA/GSM also involves
a further entity, namely the EP (Enforcement Point),
which applies per-packet enforcement policies (i.e. fil-
ters) to the traffic of the PaC’s devices.
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Figure 1: PANA/GSM full authentication pro-
cedure. The name of each message is shown, fol-
lowed by the contents of the message in round brack-
ets; square brackets are used to denote optional fields.
Figure 1 shows the PANA/GSM authentication
procedure, which has three main phases: (1) Discov-
ery and initial handshake, (2) Authentication, and
(3) Authorization. In the Discovery phase, an IP ad-
dress for the PAA is identified, and a PANA/GSM
session is established between the PaC and the PAA,
following the PANA model. In the Authentication
phase, the main focus of this article and further ex-
plained below, EAP/SIM messages encapsulated in
PANA/GSM are exchanged between the PaC and
the PAA. At the end of this phase, a PANA SA is
established, including the provision of a shared se-
cret EAP/SIM session key (MSK ); we call this the
PANA/GSM SA. During the Authorization phase, a
separate protocol is used between the PAA and the
EP to manage PaC network access control. After this
phase, the established PANA/GSM session as well as
the PANA/GSM SA is deleted, following the PANA
standard.
During the Authentication phase, the first
PANA auth request message (a) issued by the
PAA carries an EAP-Request/Identity payload.
The PaC responds (b) with a PANA auth answer,
which carries an EAP-Response/Identity payload
including the user identifier Id. After that, an
EAP-Request/SIM/START packet with the list of
EAP/SIM versions supported by the PAA is trans-
ported in a PANA auth request (c). The PaC
responds (d) with a message carrying the EAP-
Response/SIM/Start payload, which includes the
NONCE MT random number chosen by the PaC,
and the EAP/SIM version selected by the PaC. Af-
ter receiving the EAP-Response/SIM/Start payload
from the PAA by means of an AAA interaction, the
EAP server obtains the GSM triplets from the home
operator’s AuC on the GSM network (e). From the
triplets, the EAP server derives the keying material,
as specified in section 3.
The next message issued by the PAA encap-
sulates an EAP-Request/SIM/Challenge payload,
which contains the n RAND challenges and a MAC
attribute to protect the challenges (f). On receipt of
this message, the PaC runs the GSM authentication
algorithm and calculates a copy of the MAC, verifies
that the calculated MAC equals the received MAC,
and derives the EAP/SIM session keys (g). Since the
RAND challenges given to a PaC are accompanied
by the AT MAC, and since the PaC’s NONCE MT
value contributes to AT MAC, the PaC is able to ver-
ify that the EAP/SIM message is fresh (not a replay)
and that the sender possesses valid GSM triplets for
the user (the EAP server is forbidden to reuse old
triplets).
If all checks out, the PaC responds (h)
with a PANA auth answer encapsulating the EAP-
Response/SIM/Challenge containing the AT MAC
attribute, which is the output of a keyed MAC func-
tion using as input the EAP/SIM payload concate-
nated with the PaC’s SRES response values. After
receiving the EAP-Response/SIM/Challenge payload
from the PAA through an AAA interaction, the EAP
server verifies that the MAC value is correct and
sends back (i) the EAP-Success packet, which indi-
cates that the authentication was successful and also
carries derived keying material.
Finally the PAA encapsulates the EAP-Success
packet in a PANA bind request message sent to the
PaC (j), and receives back an acknowledgement
through a PANA bind answer (k). Both PANA bind
messages are protected by a MAC AVP; they may
also optionally contain a Protection-Capability AVP
to indicate if link-layer or network-layer encryption
should be initiated after PANA/GSM. They are also
used to bind device identifiers of the PaC and the
PAA to the PANA/GSM SA established at the end
of the authentication phase.
6 Security Analysis
In this section, security threats to the proposed
PANA/GSM protocol are considered.
6.1 Mutual Authentication and
Triplet Exposure
PANA/GSM provides mutual authentication via the
EAP/SIM mechanisms. The PaC believes that the
PAA is authentic because the network can calcu-
late a correct AT MAC value from the RAND chal-
lenges in the challenge request. The PAA believes
that the PaC is genuine because the MAC computed
from the SRES response values is correct. More-
over, PANA/GSM validates the EAP AVP through
its PANA message validity check scheme. However,
to calculate a correct AT MAC in order to imperson-
ate a valid PAA to the PaC, it is enough to know the
RAND andKc values from nGSM triplets of the sub-
scriber. Given physical access to the SIM card, it is
easy to obtain any number of GSM triplets. Another
way to obtain triplets is to mount an attack on the
PaC platform via a virus or other malicious software.
The PaC thus needs to be protected against triplet
querying attacks by malicious software. Moreover, if
the same SIM credentials are also used for GSM traf-
fic, the triplets could be revealed in the GSM network
– see subsection 6.7. Care should be taken not to
compromise the Kc keys used in PANA/GSM to at-
tackers when they are transmitted between entities,
or handled outside a protected environment.
6.2 Minimal Trust Relationship
The use of triplets is a GSM feature that permits del-
egation of authentication as well as cipher key distri-
bution from the HN to the VN through a minimal
trust relationship between operators. That is, the
HN does not need to reveal the most sensitive infor-
mation, such as Ki, to any intermediate entity in the
VN. Another benefit of this scheme is that subsequent
authentications do not require additional round trips
with the HN, and this gives a major performance ad-
vantage. This kind of technique can be useful in
providing heterogeneous network access supporting
ubiquitous mobility. In particular, such an approach
may be very valuable in the scenario where a user’s
access device wishes to access the Internet via dif-
ferent multiple access media and network interfaces,
leading to the use of a number of network operators.
6.3 User Identity Confidentiality
PANA/GSM includes user identity confidentiality
support, which protects the privacy of the user iden-
tity against passive attacks (e.g. eavesdropping). But
the mechanism cannot be used on the first connection
with a given PAA, when the permanent user iden-
tity needs to be sent in clear. In this case, an active
attacker that impersonates the access network may
learn the subscriber’s permanent identity. However,
the PaC can refuse to send the cleartext permanent
user identity to the PAA if it believes that the access
network should be able to recognize its pseudonym.
If user identity confidentiality is required and the
PaC and PAA cannot guarantee that the pseudonym
will be maintained reliably, then an external security
mechanism may be used to provide additional pro-
tection. Nevertheless, this kind of tunnelling mecha-
nism can itself introduce new security vulnerabilities,
as described in subsection 6.5.
6.4 Session Key Derivation
PANA/GSM key derivation combines several GSM
triplets in order to derive stronger keying material
and stronger AT MAC values. The actual strength
of the resulting keys depends, among other things, on
the operator-specific authentication algorithms, the
strength of the Ki key, and the quality of the RAND
challenges. At no point does PANA/GSM require the
keys Kc or the derived SRES values to be communi-
cated. A passive eavesdropper can learn n different
RAND values and the corresponding AT MAC and
may be able to link this information to the user iden-
tity. An active attacker that impersonates a GSM
subscriber could easily obtain n different RAND val-
ues and the corresponding AT MAC values from the
EAP server for any given user identity. However, as
long as the cryptographic functions used are suffi-
ciently robust, this should not enable the attacker to
deduce the correct SRES and Kc values.
6.5 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
Care has to be taken to avoid man-in-the-middle at-
tacks arising when tunnelling is used, e.g. when using
PEAP [13], or when EAP/SIM is part of a sequence
of EAP methods. Such vulnerabilities can arise (see,
for example, Asokan et al. [3]) even when the au-
thentication protocols used at the various ‘levels’ are
in themselves secure. When such attacks are suc-
cessfully carried out, the attacker acts as an interme-
diary between a PaC victim and a legitimate PAA.
This allows the attacker to authenticate successfully
to the PAA, as well as to obtain access to the net-
work. As a solution to the problem, Asokan et al.
[3] and Puthenkulam et al. [16] suggest cryptograph-
ically binding the session keys of the two phases, i.e.
binding together the tunnel session key and the MSK
derived from the EAP/SIM method.
6.6 Service Theft and Dictionary At-
tacks
PANA/GSM does not specify any mechanism for pre-
venting service theft. Therefore an attacker can gain
unauthorized access to the network by stealing ser-
vice from another user, spoofing both the IP and
MAC addresses of a legitimate PaC to gain unautho-
rized access. In a non-shared medium, service theft
can be prevented by simple IP address and MAC ad-
dress filters. In shared links, filters are not sufficient
to prevent service theft as they can easily be spoofed
(as described by Parthasarathy [14]). A recent draft
[15] describes how an IPsec2 SA can be established to
secure the link between the PaC and the EP, which
can be used to prevent service theft in the access net-
work. Because PANA/GSM is not a password proto-
col, it is not vulnerable to dictionary attacks, assum-
ing that the pre-shared secret is not derived from a
weak password.
6.7 Credential Reuse
PANA/GSM cannot prevent attacks in the GSM net-
works. If the same SIM credentials are also used in
GSM, it is possible to mount attacks via the GSM air
interface. A passive attacker can eavesdrop on GSM
traffic and obtain (RAND, SRES ) pairs. He can then
use a brute force attack to obtain separately the 64-
bit Kc keys used to encrypt the GSM data. If the at-
tacker can obtain n Kc keys, where 1 ≤ n ≤ 3, he can
then impersonate a valid network to a PANA/GSM
client. An active attacker can mount a “false GSM
base station (BS) attack”, replaying previously seen
RAND challenges to obtain SRES values (see [12] for
further details). He can then use a brute force attack
to obtain the Kc keys. If successful, the attacker can
impersonate a valid network or decrypt previously
seen traffic. However, it should be noted that these
attacks are not possible if the SIM credentials used
in PANA/GSM are not shared in the GSM network.
It should also be noted that performing a brute force
search for a 64-bit key is a non-trivial task that could
not be performed in real time; moreover, it is unlikely
to be worth the effort of performing such a search just
to steal network access.
6.8 Integrity, Replay Protection and
Confidentiality
The protection of signalling message exchanges
through the PANA/GSM SA prevents an opponent
from acting as a man-in-the-middle adversary, from
session hijacking, from injecting packets, from replay-
ing messages, and from modifying the content of the
exchanged packets. Also, as with all PANA methods,
in PANA/GSM an integrity object is defined, sup-
porting data-origin authentication, replay protection
based on sequence numbers, and integrity protection
based on a keyed message digest. Moreover, some
EAP/SIM attributes are used to provide integrity,
replay protection, and confidentiality for EAP/SIM
payloads, except for the EAP/SIM/Start round trip.
2http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html
However, in this latter case the protocol values are
protected by a later PANA/GSM exchange.
6.9 Negotiation Attacks, Fast Recon-
nection and Randomness
EAP method downgrading attacks might be possi-
ble, because PANA/GSM does not protect the EAP
method negotiation, especially if the user employs the
EAP/GSM identifier with other EAP methods. How-
ever, the EAP document [4] describes how to avoid
attacks that negotiate the least secure EAP method
from among a set. If a peer needs to make use of
different EAP authentication methods, then distinct
identifiers should be employed, each of which identi-
fies exactly one authentication method. In any case,
some protection against such an attack can be offered
by repeating the list of supported EAP methods pro-
tected with the PANA/GSM SA. PANA/GSM does
not support cipher suite negotiation, but includes an
EAP/SIM version negotiation procedure (see section
3). PANA/GSM supports two types of fast reconnec-
tion; since fast reconnection does not involve the en-
tire AAA communication, it gives performance ben-
efits. A PANA/GSM implementation needs to use a
good source of randomness to generate the random
numbers required in the protocol.
6.10 Denial-of-service Attacks
PANA/GSM sequence numbers and cookies provide
resistance against blind resource consumption DoS
attacks as described in [8]. But PANA/GSM does not
protect the EAP/SIM method exchange itself. Since
in particular the PAA is not allowed to discard pack-
ets, and packets have to be stored or forwarded to an
AAA infrastructure, a risk of DoS attacks remains.
Also PANA/GSM adopts the EAP/SIM mechanism
that is not a tunnelling method. Hence an adver-
sary can both eavesdrop on the EAP/SIM payloads
and inject arbitrary messages which might confuse
both the PaC and the PAA. In physically insecure
networks, an attacker may mount DoS attacks by
sending false PANA/GSM success or failure indica-
tions. However, the attacker cannot force the PaC
or the PAA to believe successful authentication has
occurred when mutual authentication has failed or
has not happened yet. The PANA/GSM protocol
also enables both the PaC and the PAA to transmit
a tear-down message [8]. This message causes state
removal, a stop to the accounting procedure, and re-
moves the installed packet filters. Thus such a mes-
sage needs to be protected to prevent an adversary
from deleting state information and thereby causing
DoS attacks.
7 Advantages & Disadvantages
In this section, the PANA/GSM proposal is assessed
with respect to how well it addresses security issues
arising in future heterogeneous network access sce-
narios. The main advantages of PANA/GSM in this
context are as follows.
• PANA/GSM is implemented using PANA, a
flexible and scalable network-layer access au-
thentication protocol. PANA/GSM also derives
from the simple, lightweight and robust GSM
mobile system.
• PANA/GSM uses the EAP/SIM method, which
provides enhancements to GSM including
stronger authentication, stronger key agreement
and mutual authentication. PANA/GSM is also
not vulnerable to dictionary attacks and, with
the exception of the PaC first connection to
PAA, it provides user identity confidentiality.
• The PANA/GSM SA prevents man-in-the-
middle attacks, session hijacking, packet in-
jection, message replay, and content modifi-
cation of the exchanged PANA/GSM packets.
The PANA/GSM integrity object supports data-
origin authentication, replay protection based on
sequence numbers, and integrity protection.
• PANA/GSM provides ordered delivery of mes-
sages with sequence numbers, which, along with
cookies, provides resistance against blind DoS
attacks. PANA/GSM also provides confidential-
ity of the EAP/SIM payload.
• PANA/GSM includes an EAP/SIM version ne-
gotiation procedure and supports two types of
fast reconnection, giving performance benefits.
Use of GSM triplets requires a minimal trust re-
lationship between operators, and also gives a
performance benefit.
The disadvantages of the proposed PANA/GSM
protocol are as follows:
• The PaC first connection to PAA is not pro-
tected by the user identity confidentiality mech-
anism.
• PANA/GSM does not specify any mechanism
for preventing service theft or for supporting
cipher suite negotiation. On the other hand,
because PANA/GSM is just a signalling proto-
col and does not carry user data traffic, in fact
it does not have to formally specify any mech-
anism for preventing service theft. However,
since EAP/SIM has key derivation functional-
ity, it is possible to bootstrap IKEv2 [6] from
PANA/GSM to establish a local IPsec tunnel for
providing both cipher suite negotiation and ser-
vice theft prevention.
• There is a risk of DoS attacks through false
EAP/SIM Success/Failure indications and tear-
down messages. Nevertheless, the EAP docu-
ment [4] describes a way to discard false success
messages, and PANA/GSM supports protected
tear-down messages by using a MAC AVP. Thus
a false failure message is the only remaining
problem. For example, the PANA/GSM proto-
col does not provide security protection for the
initial EAP payload exchange. Integrity protec-
tion can only be provided after the PANA/GSM
SA has been established. Thus the PaC will ac-
cept a PANA bind request message carrying a
false EAP Failure payload, sent by an attacker
impersonating the legitime PAA, in response to
(b) a PANA auth answer message carrying an
EAP Response/Identity payload.
8 Further Work
The session key derivation procedure in the cur-
rent version of PANA/GSM depends heavily on the
EAP/SIM protocol. Therefore one interesting alter-
native may be to adopt one of the unified EAP ses-
sion key derivation approaches currently being in-
vestigated (see, for example, Salowey and Eronen
[17]), instead of adopting the existing scheme from
EAP/SIM. An analogous scheme to PANA/GSM
would be to specify the GPRS GMM [7] and the
UMTS AKA [1] authentication protocols as an EAP
method (e.g. Buckley et al. [5] and Arkko et al.
[2]), enabling their use with PANA. Another interest-
ing new application would be the transport of pub-
lic key based authentication protocols by EAP (e.g.
Tschofenig and Kroeselberg [18]) and PANA.
9 Conclusions
Authentication and key agreement are the central
components of secure access procedures for heteroge-
neous network access supporting ubiquitous mobility.
In this paper, we have proposed the PANA/GSM pro-
tocol, providing an IP-compatible, lightweight, flex-
ible and scalable method for authenticating a user
to an access network. The protocol is based on
PANA, a network-layer access authentication proto-
col carrier, which communicates, via EAP, with an
AAA infrastructure interacting with a GSM AuC.
PANA/GSM uses the EAP/SIM protocol, which en-
capsulates GSM parameters in EAP and provides en-
hancements such as stronger authentication and key
agreement as well as mutual authentication.
The use of ‘triplets’ in PANA/GSM requires a
minimal trust relationship between operators, and
no additional round trips with the home GSM net-
work, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful
use. The protocol, from the user’s point of view,
works with a ‘standard’ GSM SIM card and requires
only an appropriate Internet access device and a SIM
card reader. The gains in performance arising from
the two types of fast reconnection, and the gains in
security due to the PANA/GSM SA, may make the
PANA/GSM proposal attractive to GSM operators
wishing to offer their users heterogeneous Internet
access in ubiquitous mobility networks.
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